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RECENT CASE NOTES
INSURANCE-RULE

OF

CONSTRUCTION-CLASSIFICATION

OF RISKS-The

plaintiff was named beneficiary in the policy in question. The policy insured "Thomas E. Holbrook, by occupation chief operator, office and superintendent only" against loss of life, effected directly and independently of
all other causes thru external, violent, etc. . . . means." The indemnity was $5000.00. The policy further provided that it "contains the
entire contract of insurance except as it may be modified by the company's
classification of risks and premium rates. In the event that the insured
is injured . . . after having changed his occupation to one classified
as more hazardous than that stated in the policy, or while he is doing any
act or thing pertaining to any occupation so classified, . . . in which
event the company will pay only such portion of the indemnities provided in the policy as the premium paid would have purchased at the rate
limits fixed by the company for such more hazardous occupation." The
second paragraph of defendant's answer set out, among other things:
. ..
that at the time of the accident which resulted in the death of
Holbrook, he was doing an act pertaining to the more hazardous occupation of electric lineman; and that under the terms of the policy his recovery should be limited to $100.00." The accident occurred at night.
There was a sudden and unexplained interruption along a particular portion of the electric line over which Holbrook had charge. The evidence
showed that Holbrook called in a lineman and that they both went out to
locate the trouble. The said lineman went up one pole but found no defect
there. They both then advanced to a nearby switch tower, and this time
Holbrook himself went up to make the investigation. It was while Holbrook was on the tower that he received a charge of electricity which
caused his death. When Holbrook went up the tower he took none of the
customary lineman's equipment . . . the evidence even showed that he
did not have a flashlight and that the lineman on the ground held a flashlight up for Holbrook. Holbrook, as superintendent, was responsible for
the service along this particular line, and in the event of an emergency
it became his duty, as such superintendent, to take all proper steps to reinstate the service, and. tho he was not required to do any physical labor,
yet he might do so in the execution of orders, in cases of emergencies, or
in showing other men how to do the work. The company's manager testified: "We use most any man for trouble when there is trouble." The
court below gave plaintiff a judgment for $5000.00. The insurance company prosecutes this appeal. Judgment of the court below affirmed. Fidelity Health and Accident Co. v. Holbrook, Appellate Court of Indiana, Dec.
4, 1929, 169 N. E. 57.
The principal question involved here turns on a proper interpretation
of the "classification of risks" clause. That such a clause is valid see:
Tobin v. National Casualty Co., 63 Cal. App. 578, 219 Pac. 482. Our Appellate Court very nicely raised the question by the following interrogatories: "Must the clause be construed to mean that the indemnity to be
paid will be diminished, if the act done by the insured is an act, including
any act pertaining to his own occupation, which may also pertain to another classed by the company as more hazardous? Or does it mean any
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act pertaining to another occupation classed by the company as more
hazardous, but in no way pertaining to his own occupation?" The court
then said in answer to these questions: "Clearly, the language is ambiguous, and the latter construction, which is more favorable to the insured,
must prevail." The rule of construction thus applied is clearly the correct
one and represents the decided weight of authority. Travelers' Protective
Association v. Jones, 75 Ind. App. 29, 127 N. E. 783; Queen Ins. Co. of
Anzerica v. Delphi Strawboard Co., 76 Ind. App. 47, 128 N. E. 697; 14 R.
C. L. 926; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 316. The construction seems the reasonable
one. See Smith v. Massachusetts Bonding Co., 179 N. C. 489, 102 S. E.
887. But contra, Ebeling v. Banker's Casualty Co., 61 Mont. 58, 201 Pac.
284.
"1. . . insurer was liable for the full amount of the policy . . .
since the provision relating to reduced indemnity did not contemplate inhibition of acts the performance of which was necessarily implied from the
vocation stated in the policy" Thorne v. Casualty Co. of America, 106 Me.
274, 76 Atl. 1106; King v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., - Mo. App.
-, 248 S. W. 984. The evidence indicates that the act done here was not
one which was beyond Holbrook's duties as "chief operator and superintendent' and the fact that incidentally the act was one customarily performed by a lineman is immaterial. That this distinction is made in the
cases see note 22 A. L. R. 780, 781; also, King v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., supra.
Ebeling v. Banker's Casualty Co., 61 Mont. 58, 201 Pac. 284, and the
cases therein cited have not been overlooked, and the reasoning of the
Montana court is not without force. On the whole, however, the reasoning of the North Carolina court in Smith v. Massachusetts Bonding Co.,
supra, is sounder. In the Ebeling case the insured was classified as a
"proprietor and meat cutter in shop," and he was killed while engaged
(temporarily) as a "tender in transit of live stock." The report of the
case gives little or no evidence, but it would seem to be a reasonable presumption that one employed as a "proprietor and meat cutter" would
hardly be called upon as such to act as "tender in transit of live stock."
In the principal case the evidence was clear that as "chief operator and
superintendent" Holbrook was expected, and others employed in similar
positions with the service company were expected, to do just what Holbrook was called upon to do in this case. In this matter we need not
indulge in presumptions,
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the evidence seems clear enough.

It is

because of this difference in the facts between the Ebeling case and the
principal case that we can distinguish the cases. That this same duty or
act pertained to a more hazardous occupation is immaterial. Thorne V4
Casualty Co. of America, supra; King v. Standard Accident Insurance Ca.,
supra. The pertinent question is, whether it was in any way connected
with the insured's occupation? If it was, plaintiff was entitled to recover
T. R. D.
$5000.00.
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ing on information furnished by an anonymous telephone call, officers
searched an oil truck driven by Ds, and found liquor. Truck had no markings, no oil faucets, bad several milk cans on the sides, was carrying but

